Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Indefinability theory of truth

The following discussion is an archived debate of the proposed deletion of the article below. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as the article's talk page or in a deletion review). No further edits should be made to this page.

The result of the debate was DELETE. Someone might want to examine the inconsistency of the two related AfD results. -Splash^talk 22:57, 25 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Original research. Apparently part of the author's dissertation. Delete. Angr/_{tɔk tə mi} 11:03, 17 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

• Delete per nominator. — JIP | Talk 11:13, 17 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

But this is an important and informative page on a credible theory of truth. The heading "Robust Theories of Truth" would be incomplete without an adumbration of this robust theory! Also ,there is no original work here. My syntheses come from others!! Arhat Virdi

• Probably delete: no non-Wikipedia Google hits [1], compared to tens of thousands for other theories of truth [2] [3], implies that this may actually be original research. An expert second opinion would be useful, though; alternatively, the contributor could provide some verifiable references. Haeleth 12:49, 17 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Auhtoritative references have been added.

• Comment See the ongoing discussion on Afd for Indefinability Theory of Truth. Dlyons493 Talk 16:13, 17 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]
• It still reads like a long dissertation and not an encyclopedia article. The references are not so much references as just more reading on something that I just read too much about. An encyclopedia article on a topic should introduce it in a concise fashion. Here is an example of what it should not be: An indefinabilist about truth subscribes to the correspondence view- that truth is agreement with reality- but resists drawing the conclusion that this succeeds in proffering a definition or explanatory reduction of the concept. If it is a valid and touted theory of knowledge, perhaps it could be placed into epistemology? As it stands it is entirely too cumbersome for this encyclopedia.—Gaff ^ταλκ 02:58, 18 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Alright! Delete the page. Will have to wait until this view becomes received wisdom before it is acceptable to articulate this very serious contender for what a theory of truth looks like. Accepted that the article does not fit into "encyclopedic" style at the moment; instead of revision I shall first advertise it globally, letting it (deservedly) receive a wider audience than it so far has. Best wishes, Arhat Virdi

• Indefinabilitists look like a sub-variety of Correspondence Theory to me, especially if you're taking Davidson as a primary example. They fit the definition on the Correspondence theory page that "The correspondence theory of truth states that something is rendered true by the existence of a fact with corresponding elements and a similar structure. A rejection of any sort of relativism about truth, this theory maintains that the truth or falsity of a statement is determined only by how it relates to the world, and whether it accurately describes (i.e., corresponds with) that world." which says nothing about whether or not such a correspondence constitutes a definition of truth. Why not add a short mention of indefinabilists as a sub-variety of correspondence theory on the correspondence theory page? You could add Alston's Minimalist theory of truth too if you wanted. 139.102.45.119 17:16, 20 October 2005 (UTC)Brian M. 12:10, 20 oct, 2005[reply]
• Indefinabilists are certainly not a subset of correspondencists about truth. Someone holding that to say of a statement that it is true means that the objects and relations expressed by that statement correspond or fit-in with the world is painting a distinctly non-indefinabilist picture. Correspondence theorists argue that their theory points to truth's being a "seriously dyadic" relation, with truth-bearers (sentences, or the proposition expressed by them) and truth-makers (facts lying in the extra-lingual realm) being distinct entities. An indefinabilist says something quite different; that there is a conceptual equivalence between saying "p is true" and saying "p corresponds to the world" and that this being so is not an insubstantial claim i.e., truth is an informative notion, not redundant or dispensable one as the minimalists or disquotationalists or any other variety of deflationism would have truth be. This answers also why minimalism's only bedfellows ought to be other deflationists (by the way, Paul Horwich is the provenience, and only current defender, of minimalism- not Alston, who is a dyed-in-the-wool realist about truth. See Alston's "A Realist Conception of Truth" 1996, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY). Arhat Virdi
• Delete Seems to be non-notable and original research. You're correct in pointing out that this won't be encyclopedic content until it becomes a widely accepted (or at least debated) theory in philosophy. --Clay Collier 22:21, 25 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the debate. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as the article's talk page or in a deletion review). No further edits should be made to this page.